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Tenancy By Entireties in
Pennsylvania
One of the interesting, curious and still important common law estates in Pennsylvania is that of the tenancy by
entireties. Sir William Blackstone, in the 2nd book of his
Commentaries, as yet the vade-mecum of the lawyers of
the old school in this state, at *page 179, treats of the subject of estates and divides it generally into estates in severalty on the one hand, and estates comprising a plurality of
tenants on the other hand; the latter classification in turn
being divided into joint tenancies, co-parcenaries and tenancies in common.
As to joint tenancies, the Act of March 31, 1812 as construed by our courts, has turned such estates into tenancies

in common, except that the proviso to the statute declares
that trust estates shall not be affected. But see Redemptorist Fathers vs. Fowler, 205 Pa. 24, (1903).
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As to co-parcenary estates, our Intestate Act of 1833
provided that in place of the co-parcenary estate, the persons to whom such lands would descend, creating at common
law such an estate, should thereafter be deemed to take and
hold as tenants in common.
An estate treated by the learned Commentator in connection with joint estates is the tenancy between husband
and wife, commonly called the tenancy by entireties.
Despite the passage of years and the onslaughts of
zealous reformers against various ancient institutions, this
holding of property by entireties by husband and wife still
flourishes in Pennsylvania with all its pristine glory and
strength, unaffected by the lapse of time, the action of the
legislature or the result of judicial decisions.
The late Mr. Justice Stewart expresses the matter very
succinctly and in his well known lucid style in the recent
case of Biehl vs. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, (1912), in the following language:
"It may be that because of modern innovations on the
common law respecting the property rights of married women, the venerable estate known as estate by entireties has
outlived the purpose of its creation and is out of harmony
with present conditions. However this may be, if change
is desired, it must come through legislative action and not
through judicial construction. This estate is too well established and too well defined to be subject to judicial impairment."
It is thought that in view of the above declaration by
one of such eminent authority and also on account of the
many interesting phases of this ancient holding, a short
review of the authorities in this state on the subject might
be helpful not only to the students but to our active practitioners.
THEORY OF MARITAL UNITY
The common law theory of the marital state, apparently adopted from genetical sources, but also, no doubt, influenced in part by notions of the physical as well as men-
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tal superiority of man over woman, has always been that in
legal contemplation, after the marriage, the two become one
person and were consequently viewed by the law as a unity
rather than as a duality of persons.
In thhe 11th edition of Encyclopedia Brittanica, Vol. 14,
page 2, an unnamed editor, after stating the doctrine of the
civil law, refers to the common law on this subject, characterizing it as "entirely insular and independent," in this
wise:
"The text writers all assume two fundamental principles, which between them, established a system of rights
totally unlike that just described. Husband and wife were
said to be one person in the eye of the law-unica persona,
quia caro una et sanguis unus. Hence, a man could not
grant or give anything to his wife, because she was himself,
and if there were any compacts between them before marriage they were dissolved by the union of persons. * * * * The
unity however, was one-sided only; it was the wife who was
merged in the husband and not the husband in the wife.
And when the theory did not apply, the disabilities of
'coverture' suspended the active exercise of the wife's legal
facilities. The old technical phraseology described husband and wife as baron and feme; the rights of the husband
were baronial rights. From one point of view, the wife was
merged in the husband; from another, she was as one of his
vassals."
The legal conception of entity due to activities of groups
of persons has been common both to the civil and to our own
law. The civil law idea of unity or entity is exemplified by
the doctrine of pater familias who was the head of the family
and in whose personality all activities of the family group
legally were centered.
In our own law two instances may be mentioned illustrating the same idea of unity or entity; notably where a
Bishop or Archbishop or other high ecclesiastical dignitary
has vested in him as a sort of corporate head all of the
property belonging to the ecclesiastical division over which
the dignitary in question presides; and also in the well known
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instance of partnership where one of the theories much
insisted upon by some learned writers is that the partners
by their contract create an entity, or person distinct in the
law and separate from the partners themselves, analagous
to the entity theory in the case of corporations.
As regards the relation of husband and wife, the unity
theory thus appears to be based upon two ideas somewhat
different or divergent. First, that the unity or entity is a
genetical resultant of the contract of marriage and that
henceforth the two persons become one; secondly; that by
virtue of the marriage contract, the personality of the wife
becomes lost by merger into that of the husband and by
reason of the dominion of the latter she has become a sort
of vassal or servant.
The Pennsylvania decisions in domestic relations early
adopted the common law theory of unity, without, however,
distinguishing very particularly the basis upon which the
theory was founded.
It will be interesting, however, to bear in mind these
two theories and observe how they are affected by the decisions of the courts and the Married Women's Property
Acts.
Respecting the common law theory, the matter is well
placed by Rodgers, J., in McKinley vs. McGregor, 3 Wharton 369, (1838), in these words:
"By the civil law, husband and wife are considered as
persons capable of distinct and separate rights and of making separate contracts, and they may even sue each other,
as independent individuals; but by the common law, they
are looked upon as one person; the legal existence of the wife
is to all civil purposes, merged in that of her husband; and
consequently, generally speaking, any contract made with
her is absolutely void."
The same learned Justice, in 1845 in the case of Stickney vs. Borman, 2 Pa. 67, used practically the same language and reasoning in arriving at the conclusion that a
conveyance by the husband to the wife without the intervention of a trustee was void at law. Many other cases might
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be cited from our decisional law showing the complete adoption of this common law theory of unity.
MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACTS-UNITY
PRESERVED.
In the famous case of Stuckey vs. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397,
(1856), our court held that a conveyance to husband and wife
It as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants," was nevertheless a tenancy by the entireties due to the application
of the common law theory of unity. However, as the facts
arose prior to the Married Women's Property Act of 1848, the
court closed its opinion with a statement to this effect, and
the reporter in the headnote of the case queries as to the
effect of such a conveyance in view of the Act of the 11th
of March, 1848.
This question was answered eleven years later by Mr.
Justice Strong in the case of Diver vs. Diver, 56 Pa. 106,
(1867):
"But it is said the Act of 1848, by destroying the legal
unity of the husband and wife, has converted such an estate into a tenancy in common; that is, that such a deed
conveyed a different estate from that which the same deed
would have created, if made prior to the passage of the Act.
To this we cannot assent. It mistakes alike the letter and
spirit of the statute, imputing to it a purpose never intended.
The design of the legislature was single. It was not to destroy the oneness of husband and wife, but to protect the
wifes property by removing it from under the dominion of
the husband. To effectuate this object, she was enabled to
own, use and enjoy her property, if hers before marriage, as
fully after marriage as before. And the Act declared that
if her property accrued to her after marriage, it should be
owned, used and enjoyed by her as her own separate property, exempt from liability for the debts and engagements
of her husband. All this had in view the enjoyment of that
which is hers, not the force and effect of the instrument by
which an estate may be granted to her. It has nothing to
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do with the nature of the estate. The Act does not operate
upon rights accruing to her until after they have accrued. It
takes such rights of property as it finds them and regulates
the enjoyment; that is, the enjoyment of the estate after it
has vested in the wife. And the mode of authorized enjoyment is significant. It is to be as her separate property is
enjoyed, as property settled to her separate use. The Act
therefore, no more destroys her union with her husband
than does a settlement of property for her separate use. To
a certain extent, she is enabled, but no more than is necessary, to protect her property after it has been acquired. We
have held that she can convey her lands only by joining in
a deed with her husband: Pettit vs. Fretz, 9 Casey 118. This
is a clear recognition of the existing unity of the two."
Three years later, in the case of Gillan vs. Dixon, 65
Pa. 395, the Supreme Court, citing Diver vs Diver, and referring again to the Act of 1848, per Justice Agnew, said:
"That Act was intended to protect property of the wife
from the dominion or control of the husband, but not to
change the nature of her estate or to destroy the legal unity
of person which characterizes their relation to each other."
To the same effect is the case of Holcomb vs. The People's Savings Bank, 92 Pa. 338 (1879).
In Braraberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, (1893), the Court
was called upon to construe the later Act of June 3, 1887, P.
L. 332. Said Mr. Justice McColfum, quoting the language
of Diver vs. Diver:
"We think this language in reference to the Act of 1848
and the tenancy by entireties is applicable to the Act of June
3, 1887 and the case under consideration. The Act of 1887,
like the Act of 1848, was intended 'to protect the property
of the wife from the dominion or control of the husband, but
not to change the nature of her estate or to destroy the legal
unity of person which characterize their relations to each
other:' Gillan's Executors vs. Dixon, Supra."
In Hoover vs. Potter, 42 Sup. 21, (1910), the Superior
Court, per Henderson, J., after referring to the general doc-
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trine of tenancies by the entireties and the constructions of
the Supreme Court on prior Married Women's Property
Acts, referring to the Act now in operation in Pennsylvania,
said:
"The restrictions of the Act of 1893 on married women
with reference to actions against their husbands, are inconsistent with the theory of a tenancy in common in the case
of a conveyance to husband and wife and a material incident
to such an estate is withheld; to wit: the right of the wife
to divide her estate or to protect it from her husband by adverse legal proceedings, where he has not deserted her or
refused to support her. It seems consistent, therefore, with
the object of these statutes and prior adjudications on the
same subject to hold that the conveyance in this case created an estate by entireties."
In O'Malley vs. O'Malley, 78 Sup. 10, (1921), the same
court, per Mr. Justice Keller, said:
"The very statutes enlarging the powers of married
women and securing them control of their individual property, real and personal, have not altered the law as to the
incidents and characteristics of the estate by the entireties.
This point was ruled squarely by the Supreme Court as to
the Act of April 11, 1848, P. L. 536, in McCurdy vs. Canning,
64 Pa. 39; as to the Act of June 3, 1887, P. L. 332, in Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628; and as to the Act of June 8,
1893, P. L. 344, in Hetzel vs. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, and Myers'
Estate, 232 Pa. 89."
From a review of the above cases, it would appear that
the courts in construing the effect of the Married Women's
Property statutes on the common law theory of the relation
of husband and wife, have entirely eliminated from the law
the vassal, servant or dominion theory and have retained in
full efect the legal conception of the unity of husband and
wife or the treating of the two as an entity.
The amending Act of 27th March, 1913, P. L. 14, enabling spouses to bring suits against each other for the purpose
of protecting and recovering separate property, being an
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amendment of Section 3 of the Act of June 8, 1893, is not
conceived, despite some expressions in opinions already
cited, to work any change in the theory of the common law
unity. The basic idea of this legislation is still to simply
enlarge the activities of a married woman in respect to that
which may be properly denominated as her separate property
and is to be restricted to this narrow channel.
In Smith vs. Smith, 29 Dist. Rep. 10, (1919), it was held
upon demurrer that a wife could not bring suit against her
husband in trespass for alleged negligence in driving an
automobile by which she was injured, as the Act of March 27,
1913, P. L. 14, expressly limits her right to suit against him
to proceedings in divorce and for the protection and recovery
of her separate property and does not give her a right of action against him for a personal tort.
See also Moore vs. Moore, 1 D. & C. Rep. 749, (1922).
APPLICATION OF UNITY THEORY-REAL
ESTATE.
In the 2nd book of the Commentaries, at *page 179,
Blackstone makes the following reference to tenancies by
entireties:
"And therefore, if an estate in fee be given to a man
and his wife they are neither properly joint tenants nor tenants in common; for husband and wife being considered as
one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties but
both are seized of the entirety, per tout et non per my; the
consequence of which is that neither the husband nor the
wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the other
but the whole must remain to the survivor."
In Johnson vs. Hart, 6 W. & S. 319, (1843), a conveyance
was made to a husband and wife and a stranger "as tenants in common and not as joint tenants." Our Supreme
Court held that the husband and wife took an undivided onehalf of the estate holding as tenants by entireties and the
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third person held the other undivided one-half, the result
being a tenancy in common by the husband and wife as a unit
and the stranger. This result was attained by regarding the
husband and wife as one person only in the law.
In Fairchild vs. Chastelleux, 1 Pa. 176, (1845), the Supreme Court, per Kennedy, J., said:
"Under the deed of conveyance from Vincent LeRoy,
the plaintiff below and his wife took and held the estate
thereby given to them by entireties and not by moieties.
They held per tout et non per my so that the husband could
not, by his conveyance alone, divest his wife of her interest,
if she should survive him, in which event she would be entitled to the whole. But nothwithstanding they held the fee
not in moieties, but in severalty, with the right of survivorship so that neither can alien any part thereof without the
consent of the other, yet the husband may be said to have
the absolute control of the estate during his life, and may
convey or mortgage it during that period. Branberry vs.
Harris, 15 Wend. 615."
In Auman vs. Auman, 21 Pa. 343, (1853), a conveyance
was made to A and his wife for and during their natural lives
or the life of the survivor and after their decease to the lawful heirs of them, the said A and his wife. By the application of the rule in Shelly's case and the doctrine of entireties, it was held that the husband and wife took a joint estate in fee simple and the husband, having died subsequently,
his wife surviving him, the whole estate went to the survivor
and therefore a conveyance made by the wife after the death
of her husband gave the grantee an estate in fee simple.
In Stuckey vs. Keefe, 26 Pa. 397, (1856), a conveyance
was made to William Blair and Rebecca, his wife, their heirs
and assigns "as tenants in common and not as joint tenants."
In an action of ejectment, the title of this land came into
question and the controversy was as to whether the right of
survivorship existed under the deed to Blair and his wife so
as to vest the whole estate in Rebecca Blair after the death
of her husband. The lower court decided that this was
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sold. The question in this action of ejectment was as to what
actual interest of Robert Canning in the premises was sold.
It was held that the conveyance to husband and wife created
a tenancy by entireties and although prior to the Act of 1848
on such judgment, the estate of the husband might be sold
and possession of the premises given to the purchaser for
the life of the husband; the Act of 1848 now interposes its
insuperable bar to such a result; the lower court, per Thayer,
J., said:
"The case, therefore, stands thus: Here is a married woman who is neither a joint tenant or tenant in common with
the husband, but who is seized of the whole estate, and with
him entitled to possession of the whole. If a purchaser of
the husband's interest may be put into possession with her,
what follows? This: 1st. You have destroyed her estate
and turned her entirety into a joint tenancy or tenancy in
the case and upon writ of error, the Supreme Court, per Chief
Justice Lewis, said:
"But what answer can be given to the case of Dias &
Burn vs. Glover, 1 Hoffman's Ch. Rep. 71? In that case the
conveyance was to husband and wife alone, to hold expressly
'as tenants in common, and in equality of estate, and not
as joint tenants.' The express grant to them to hold as tenants in common was entirely borne down by the rule of law.
There was no third grantee in that case. The words were
not permitted to have any operation whatever in creating
a tenancy in common. They were rendered nugatory by
the incapacity of husband and wife to take as tenants in common, and the case was decided on the principle which governs all grants to husband and wife. Like the rule in Shelly's
Case, it operates irrespective of the intention of the parties."
See also Martin vs. Jackson, 27 Pa. 504, (1856), Bates vs.
Seely, 46 Pa. 248, (1863).
In McCurdy vs. Canning, 64 Pa. 39, (1370), the conveyance was to Robert Canning and Eliza Canning, his wife,
"their heirs and assigns." Later a judgment was entered
against Robert Canning and his interest in the premises was
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common. 2nd. You have deprived her altogether of the
possession, because it is not in the nature of things that she
can enjoy actual possession with a stranger as she did with
her husband. 3rd. You have taken away her property without her consent and destroyed her rights, which were protected by the Act of April 11, 1848. She was entitled to
possession of the whole with her husband. You propose to
give possession of the whole with a stranger, a possession
which she cannot, and which he probably would not, enjoy.
If it should be answered that the property may be rented,
and a moiety of the rents and profits may be paid to her, that
is only to say that you may deprive her of her estate and give
her another of inferior value, a substitution which you have
no right to propose. These considerations lead us to the
conclusion that one who, without the consent of the wife,
purchases the husband's interest in the real estate in which
both husband and wife are seized of the entirety, and to the
possession of the whole of which she is entitled equally with
him, does not acquire, during the wife's life any right to the
possession, either jointly with her or to her entire exclusion.
Practically these two propositions are not alternatives but
the same, for we can as easily marry her to a stranger as
marry her possessions to his without destroying her estate."
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court
upon this opinion.
APPLICATION OF UNITY THEORYPERSONAL PROPERTY
The estate by entireties may be created not only as to
real property, as seen heretofore, but also as to personal property, and this personalty may consist of either choses in
possession or choses in action.
In Gillan vs. Dixon, 65 Pa. 395, (1870) the facts were
that Elizabeth Gillan died unmarried, intestate, and without
issue, leaving to survive her as heirs at law, her father and
mother. At the time of her death she owned two notes; one
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for $1000, due by the Commissioners of Franklin County, and
one for $200, due by John Walker. At the time of her death
she was living with her father, who in turn died later leaving
his wife, Sarah Gillan, and six children. By the terms of
his will, he gave legacies to his three daughters and the residue of his estate to his three sons. The Commissioners' note
was collected by the defendants who were the executors
of the estate of William Gillan, the father of Elizabeth Gillan. Sarah Gillan, the widow of William Gillan, later died
intestate.
The case was an action of assumpsit and it was agreed
that the plaintiffs were to be considered as having the same
right to recover as though they were the administrators of
Sarah Gillan, widow of William Gillan, deceased, or of Elizabeth Gillan, the deceased daughter of the said William Gillan.
The question in the case was whether the notes of Elizabeth Gillan became the property of her father in his lifetime
and thus passed into his estate or whether they survived to
the mother, and were to be distributed as a part of her estate.
The lower court charged the jury, inter alia, as follows:
"If the choses had been converted into money, or anything been done by William Gillan in the lifetime of himself
and wife to destroy their joint nature (for upon the death
of Elizabeth they became joint choses in the father and
mother), then, doubtless the father, William, would have taken one-half of the sum to himself and the mother, Sarah, the
other one-half, and upon the death of William, his executors
would save rightly claimed and held his one-half as part of
his estate. But at the time of William Gillan's death these
notes or choses were the joint property of himself and his
wife and as such survived to the surviving wife. For a suit
brought upon these notes in the lifetime of the father and
mother must have been in their joint names, and it is a general rule that in all cases where it is necessary to bring the
suit in the joint names of husband and wife during coverture, the cause of action survives to the wife for her benefit.
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When money is secured to the husband and wife by a promissory note, the wife is held to be entitled to survivorship in
the money."
Verdict was for the plaintiffs and upon writ of error,
the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. Said Agnew,
J:
"When Elizabeth Gillan died, her personal estate ves-ea
in her father and mother jointly and absolutely under th6
third section of Act of April 8, 1833 relatinig to intestates.
This interest of the father and mother was a chose in action, enforceable only through administration upon the estate .of Elizabeth. That their interest is joint in its nature
has been held and is evident from the intent of the act:
Frankenfield vs. Gruver, 7 Barr 448; Hamm vs. Meisenhelter,
9 Watts 349. Until distribution of the estate of Elizabeth
and payment of the sum coming to the father and mother,
their interest necessarily remained joint. * * * * * It is clear,
therefore, that the title to receive the share thus devolving on
the father and mother by the intestacy of Elizabeth survived
to Mrs. Sarah Gillan on the death of William Gillan, her husband. This resulted from their relation as husband and
wife. Owing to their legal unity they did not stand as
ordinary joint tenants to each other, but were seized or possessed as the case might be of the estate or interest in the
property by entireties and not per my et per tout. This is
well settled in this state both as to real and personal estate:
Johnson vs. Hart; 6 W. & S. 319; Robb vs. Beaver, 8 Id.
107; Fairchild vs. Chastelleux, 1 Barr 176; Stuckey vs. Keefe,
2 Casey 397."
To the same effect is Holcomb vs. People's Savings Bank,
72 Pa. 338, (1879). See also, Hamm vs. Meisenhelter, 9

Watts 349, (1840).
In Parry's Est. 188 Pa. 33, (1898), letters of credit were
issued to W. A. Parry and Minnie H. Parry, his wife, the
same to be used by them in foreign travel.

The husband

having died while the two were on a trip abroad, the question
arose in the settlement of his estate who had title to a bal-
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ance of over $12,000 unpaid at the time of his death on the
letters of credit. It was held that the wife took the amount
in question as the survivor of her husband on the theory that
the funds represented by the letters of credit were held by
them as tenants by entireties.
In Bramberry's Est., 156 Pa. 628, (1893), a husband
and wife received a tract of land by conveyance to them
jointly. This land was held by them for twenty-five years
when they sold it and took from their vendee a bond and
mortgage to secure to them a portion of the purchase money.
Ten days after this sale was consummated by conveyance,
the wife died and the question presented in the distribution
of her estate was whether one-half of the sum so secured
by bond and mortgage belonged to her estate, or whether
her husband as survivor was the owner of the entire fund.
The auditor surcharged the husband, as accountant, for onehalf of the mortgage-and exceptions to this report were dismissed by the lower court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the fund in
question, having been derived from the sale of the real estate held by husband and wife by entireties and the bond
and mortgage running in the same names, the estate by entireties continued and the husband was entitled as owner
of the entire fund upon the death of his wife and consequetly the decree of the lower court was reversed.
In Kenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572, (1905), a deposit of
money in a savings bank was made in the names of Henry
and Catherine Klenke, and at the time the account was opened the depositors signed the following agreement:
"The undersigned, who have made deposits in their
joint names in The Iron and Glass Dollar Savings Bank,
hereby direct the bank to honor and pay all checks and deposits that we or either 6f us may draw upon the bank durinig the continuance of said account; and also authorize the
bank to pay out to both or either of us any and all moneys
to our joint credit upon both or either of us receipting for
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the same in our joint or individual names. This authority
to continue to the survivor in case of the death of either."
It was decided by the lower court that the deposit of
money was held by husband and wife by entireties. The
following cases were cited by the court: Donnelly's Est., 7 Pa.
C. C. 196; Parry's Est., 188 Pa. 33; Bramberry's Est. 156 Pa.
628. The decree and judgment of the lower court were affirmed by the Supreme Court, per curiam.
In Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346, (1916), deposits in bank
were made by a husband, payable, one to himself or wife,
another to himself and wife, and it was held that an estate
by entireties had been created and the legal ownership of
the fund vested in the survivor. Per Walling, J:
"The rule that the title to property held jointly by husband and wife vests in the survivor applies to personal as well
as to real property: Bramberry's Est., 156 Pa. 628; Parry's
Est., 188 Pa. 33; Kenke's Est. (No. 1), 210 Pa. 572." See
also Rhode's Estate, 277 Pa. 450, (1923), Blick vs. Cockins,
252 Pa. 56, (1916).
CONVEYANCE OF SPOUSES TO THE UNITY
Suppose a tract of land is held by the husband in his own
right and it is the desire of himself and wife to create from
this holding an estate by the entireties vested in the two
spouses- By what methods of conveyancing can this be accomplished?
Under one method well known to Pennsylvania lawyers,
the husband and wife may convey the legal title of the
premises involved to a third person as a quasi-trustee and
the latter in turn immediately executes and delivers a conveyance of the title from himself to the husband and wife
as tenants by the entirety.
At the present time, it is well settled law in Pennsylvania that a husband may convey and give good title directly to his wife without the intervention of a trustee although at one time in this state it was declared that a deed
from a husband directly to his wife was nullity at common
law, such conclusion resulting inevitably from the principle

/
140
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that the husband and wife constituted one person and were
therefore incapable of contracting with each other. However, equity intervened and sustained all such conveyances
provided they were not prejudicial to creditors. See Coates
vs. Gerlach, 44 Pa. 43, (1862), per Strong, J.
At common law and under the Married Women's Property Acts, a wife was precluded from conveying her real estate without the assent of the husband but by the provissions of Section 1 of the Act of June 3, 1911, P. L. 631, a
married woman may now lawfully make a conveyance of
real estate to her husband just as if she were a femme sole.
No case has been found in the Pennsylvania reports determining the question whether a spouse may now create an
estate by entireties by conveying the land so owned directly
to the spouses, but the problem did arise in New York State
and is discussed in the case of Klatzl's Est., 216 N. Y. 83;
110 N. E. 181, (1915). In the matter of a. death transfer
tax on the estate of John C. Klatzl, deceased, it appeared
that Klatzl, by deed, conveyed certain premises to himself
and wife as tenants by entirety, and the question was whether
at his death such estate was subject to the New York Death
Transfer Tax Law.
The decision determining that the interest taken by the
wife was subject to tax was reached by a divided court, the
majority differing among themselves, however, as to the
nature of the estate created.
Collin, J., concurred in by two Justices, dissented from
the conclusion of the majority and held emphatically that
the conveyance in question created an estate by entireties.
His opinion is interesting as throwing light upon the problem raised in this section and also as indicating his view
of the nature of an estate by entireties. Among other things,
the learned Justice declared:
"There existed the legal unity which characterizes the
relation of husband and wife and the conveyance to the
husband and wife. * * * * The ownership it devolves was

in both grantees as one person.

They, while

both

were
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living, held the estate as one owner under one title, and upon
the death of the husband the wife was that owner under that
title * * * * The husband did not convey to himself but to

a legal unity or entity which was .the consolidation of himself and another

*

* * * Estates by the entirety and the

creation of them by conveyance to a husband and his wife
are clearly defined and fixed rules of property in our law,
which, until legislation, direct and unequivocal, interdicts,
should be observed and enforced."
The above expressions accord perfectly with the general
theory of the nature of an entirety estate as it has been developed at common law and in this state, and the opinion is
ventured that according to our law a conveyance similar to
that in the Klatzl Case would create a valid estate by entirety and in view of the Act of June 3, 1911, already cited,
the same result would be reached if the grantor were the
wife instead of the husband as in the Klatzl Case. However,
safe practice and a due observance of the usual conservatism
of lawyers would dictate the safer course of using in the
creation of such an estate, under facts as above, the well
known trustee method.
PARTITION AND APPARENT EXCEPTIONS
In Stehman vs. Huber, 21 Pa. 260, (1853), Jacob Gainber was seized of certain real estate and died leaving Anne
Stehman, et al, as his heirs at law; later the land was amicably partitioned and Anne Stehman's share was conveyed
as follows:
"To Tobias B. Stehman and Anna, his wife, and to the
heirs and assigns of the said Anna forever," in severalty,
subject to the payment of $6,000 and interest thereon for
owelty money. The husband becoming subsequently indebted and a judgment having been entered against him, on sci.
fa. and fi. fa. issued, the question arose as to what was the
husband's interest in the above conveyance. In delivering
the opinion of the court, Lowrie, J., said:
"When land is held in common by a married woman and
others, and they all join in a partition, and her share is con-
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veyed to her and her husband, the law looks at the character
of the transaction, rather than at the form of thd conveyance,
in order to define her interest, and considers the share as
still hers, a divided share being substituted for an undivided
one."
In Taylor vs. Birmingham, 29 Pa. 306, (1857), the facts
were that John Taylor devised certain lands to his sons, Alexander and Wilson, and several years after the father's
death, the sons made an amicable partition of the lands so devised. Alexander and wife conveyed to Wilson Taylor
and Sarah Anne, his wife, the part allotted to Wilson, and
Wilson and wife executed and delivered a deed to Alexander
and Elizabeth, his wife, for the other purpart. Later, on
the death of Alexander Taylor, the testator gave to his wife
an estate in the lands which were the subject of the above
petition, "so long as she remains my widow." Several years
afterwards, Elizabeth Taylor, the widow of Alexander, conveyed the land by deed duly acknowledged to Joseph Birmingham and this grantee went into possession, and later
Elizabeth Taylor married Daniel 0. Bailey. An ejectment
for the lands above conveyed was brought by Oliver Cromwell Taylor, nephew of Alexander Taylor, who, under the
will of the said Alexander, was given the fee of the lands
in case of the widow's remarriage.
Judgment was entered on a verdict for the plaintiff and
on writ of error the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the court below holding that the form of the partition of
veyance would be ignored and that the law would look at the
character of the transaction which disclosed the fact that
Elizabeth Taylor had no title under the deed and that the
entire fee despite the form of the conveyance, was in Alexander Taylor at the time of his death.
Woodward, J., in the opinion of the court approved of
the position taken by the court below, inter alia, as follows:
"The true mode of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, or any other transaction, is to place ourselves as nearly as possible in their situation at the time,
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with all the facts and circumstances surrounding them. Such
a stand-point will afford a much clearer view than any other.
Here, then, we have the two brothers holding in common,
as their deeds declare, a large tract of land devised to them
by their father, under specific directions how it shall be divided and held in severalty. We find them making a division
of the same according to these direction, and each taking
exclusive possession of his own portion-then follows the
execution and delivery of mutual deeds alike in everything
but the transposing of the names and the description of the
property. The consideration in each is one dollar. These
facts taken together clearly characterize the transaction as
one of partition merely, and not an ordinary purchase and
sale, so as to bring it under the rule of law, applicable to
the case of survivorship by the wife." See Stoffal vs. Jarvis,
235 Pa. 50, (1912).
In Dexter vs. Billings, 110 Pa. 135, (1885), a deed was
made by a brother to his married sister and her husband
jointly for her interest in her father's real estate. In an action of trespass, q. c. f. by the husband and wife to recover damages for cutting and removing timber from the
land in question, the pleas were not quilty and Statute of
Limitations. Evidence was offered at the trial to show that
although the deed was in the name of the husband and wife,
yet the land embraced was the wife's interest in her father's
estate. This was for the purpose of showing that the real interest was in the married woman and hence the plea of the
statute did not apply to her. Held that the evidence should
have been admitted for the purpose as offered.
In Young's Est. 166 Pa. 645, (1895), a mortgage was assigned to David Young and Elizabeth Young, his wife, "to
have and to hold to the said David Young and Elizabeth
Young, his wife, their heirs, and assigns forever, in equal
moieties or one-half parts as tenants in common; that is to
say, one full equal moiety or one-half part unto the said
David Young, his heirs, executors and assigns, and the other
full equal moiety or one-half part to Elizabeth Young, her
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heirs, executors and assigns." It was held by the Supreme
Court, per Williams, J., after discussing various cases on
the subject of the legal unity of husband and wife, that
David Young and Elizabeth Young, his wife, took the mortgage in equal moieties or one-half parts as tenants in common.
The facts disclosed that the land had been owned by David
Young and that his wife had refused to join in a deed of
conveyance unless she were given a part of the purchase
money and as the purchaser was to give a mortgage for a
part of the unpaid purchase money, the arrangement as to
the mortgage money was made as above set forth. This,
according to the court, brought the case within the exceptions
already noted in Taylor vs. Birmingham and Dexter vs. Billings.
In Bedford Lodge vs. Lentz, 194 Pa. 399, (1899), a conveyance of land to husband and wife was in the following
language:
"To have and to hold the said parts of lots aforesaid,
etc. unto the said Hiram Lentz and Mary Lentz, his wife,
their heirs and assigns, to and for the only proper use and behoof of the said Hiram Lentz during the term of his natural
life, with the remainder to the said Mary Lentz, his wife,
her heirs and assigns forever."
It was held that the husband took only a life estate in
the land with the remainder in fee to his wife, the Supreme
Court saying:
"The habendum expressly limits the estate of the husband to one for life, with remainder to the wife, her heirs
and assigns. True, the premises described an estate by entireties, and during their joint lives, the grantees practically
so held. Neither could have ousted the other. Neither
could have estrepement for waste, partition or account rendered against the other. But, evidently the grantor intended
the estate of the husband should have ended with his life,
which he so says."
In Rhode's Est., 232 Pa. 489, (1911), a father, by deed
executed and delivered, conveyed certain premises therein
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described to his daughter, "Nancy Rhodes and her husband,
Hugh D. Rhodes." In the receipt attached to the deed, the
father acknowledged to have received of the daughter and her
husband $6,000 of which sum $3,700 was stated as representing the daughter's interest in the father's estate. It was held
that the daughter and her husband took an estate in entireties and she, dying before her husband, the latter would
take the premises absolutely. Said Potter, J:
"It is true that the law looks at the character of the
transaction as well as at the form of conveyance. If the
deed be made merely in partition of land in which either husband or wife had already acquired a vested interest, it is in
such case merely substituting a divided share for an undivided
one," citing Stehman vs. Huber, 21 Pa. 260; Taylor vs. Birmingham, 29 Pa. 306; Dexter vs. Billings, 110 Pa. 135;
Young's Est., 166 Pa. 645; Bedford Lodge vs. Lentz, 194 Pa.
399, and continuing the court said:
"The father evidently intended to convey the lands described to his daughter and her husband jointly for the consideration of $6,000, of which sum there was paid by the husband $2,300, in round numbers, and the balance was intended
to represent the amount of his daughter's interest in his estate. Under the terms by which the estate was created, if
the husband had predeceased his wife, she would have taken
the whole of the estate. But as the husband survived, he
took the estate in fee simple. We think the conclusion
reached by the learned judge of the court below was correct."
INTENTION AND THE UNITY THEORY
In Stuckey vs. Keefe, Supra., Lewis, C. J. sets forth very
clearly the common law view of the marriage relation. By
the marriage there is a "matrimonial union" and a "legal
personage" is created different from the two natural persons
composing the union. Consequently, a conveyance to husband and wife creates neither a tenancy in common nor a
joint tenancy. Such tenancies are made up of divisible parts
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but as the husband and wife constitute a union a conveyance to
them must be to the union, and hence is made up of indivisible parts. In case of the death of either spouse the survivor takes no new estate for, says the learned Chief Justice:
"The loss of an adjunct merely reduces the legal personage holding the estate to an individuality identical with the
natural person. The whole estate continues in the survivor
the same as it would continue in a corporation after the death
of one of the corporators: 1 Dana 244; 7 Yerger 319. This
has been the settled law for centuries."
In answering the question whether the holding of the
estate by the spouses by entireties is merely a rule of construction or whether it is a result ex necessitate, the Chief
Justice puts it in this way:
"If the doctrine to which we refer is not a mere rule for
ascertaining the meaning of words, but a rule of law founded on the rights and incapacities of the matrimonial union,
it must be obvious that the intention of the parties to the conveyance is entirely immaterial. If husband and wife cannot
take a conveyance by moieties, if they are absolutely incapable of receiving such a grant, it is clear that no words in
the conveyance to them, however clearly expressed, can
give them that capacity."
Upon the citation of much ancient authority and nothing
to the contrary except a statement by Mr. Preston, in his
work on "Estates," Volume 1, page 132, the learned Chief
Justice takes the position that intention of the parties is
necessarily irrelevant and like the rule in Shelly's Case, the
result by entireties happens irrespective of such intention.
Thus, the law has stood unquestioned in Pennsylvania
for almost three quarters of a century except for certain expressions of opinion by one Justice of our Supreme Court.
In Merritt vs. Whitlock, 200 Pa. 50 (1901), Mitchell, J.,
after referring to the doctrine as laid down in Stuckey vs.
Keefe and suggesting that the incapacity of husband and
wife to take as joint tenants or as tenants in common was a
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strict logical deduction from their entire unity at common
law, and that the statutes in relation to married women severed "this unity" as to property thus rendering the reason of
the rule no longer applicable, opines:
"And it may be considered as still an open question
whether they may not, now, since the Acts referred to, take,
as well as held, in common, if that be the actual intent,
notwithstanding the legal presumption to the contrary."
In Alles vs. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, (1907), the same learned
Justice, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, raised the
same doubt and in referring to the rule of law in Stuckey vs.
Keefe founded on the rights and incapacities of the matrimonial union which rendered the intention of the parties immaterial, stated:
"No subsequent case has gone so far, and in Merritt vs.
Whitock, 200 Pa. 50, it was said that it may be considered
as still an open question whether husband and wife may not,
since the Married Women's Property Acts, take, as well as
hold, in common if that be the clear, actual intent, notwithstanding the presumption to the contrary."
Upon careful inspection of these two critical opinions by
the same learned Justice, it will clearly appear that the expressions on this subject contained therein were purely obiter
dicta.
In Hoover vs. Potter, 42 Pa. Sup. 21, (1910), the conveyance presented for construction was to John H. Beecher and
Annie E. Beecher, his wife, "as tenants in common," and
in affirming the judgment entered by the court below, Henderson, 3., referred to the ancient rule of law as exemplified
by the English decisions and our' own case of Stuckey vs.
Keefe and the long line of subsequent decisions to the effect
that a conveyance to husband and wife even as tenants
in common could not vest the title otherwise than in the legal
unit. In referring to Merritt vs. Whitlock, 200 Pa. 50, and
the doubt suggested by Justice Mitchell, the court used this
significant language:
"It might be argued with good reason that under the
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peculiar language of this deed there was an express grant
of an undivided one-half to the wife."
In the early case of Johnson vs- Hart, 6 W. & S. 319,
(1843), the language of the conveyance both in the premises and in the habendum designated the grantees as "Hannah
Speakman of, etc., and John Hart, of etc. and Lydia, his
wife, of the other part." It was held that Hannah took onehalf of the estate as a tenant in common, and Hart and wife
as a unit took the other half, thus making a tenancy in common between Hannah and the Harts but a tenancy by entireties as to the interest of an undivided half taken by the Harts.
At the close of the opinion of the court, Kennedy, J., intimated that the decision might have been otherwise if the
language of the deed had clearly indicated that each one of
the three persons named as grantees was to take an unvided one-third of the estate, but declared that the language
of the deed in question did not show that clearly.
The last utterance of our Supreme Court is found in
Blease vs. Anderson, 241 Pa. 198, (1913), an amicable action
in ejectment and case stated to determine the title to real
estate.
The facts were that William Anderson and Rhoda, his
wife, purchased and took possession of an undivided fourfifth interest in a farm, the other undivided one-fifth interest
already belonging at the time of said purchase to the said
Rhoda. The material parts of the deed conveying the title
to the Andersons are as follows:
"This indenture made November 30, 1904, between
Mary E. Heft * * * * parties of the first part, and William

Anderson and Rhoda A. Anderson * * * * parties of the second part, witnesseth that the said parties of the first part, etc.
grant unto the parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, all the undivided four-fifths of that piece or tract of
land, etc. It is understood and agreed that there is hereby
conveyed an undivided ten-fifteenths part to the said William
Anderson and an undivided two-fifteenths part to the said
Rhoda A. Anderson, so that Rhoda A. Anderson, being al-
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ready the owner of an undivided three-fifteenths part as devisee of her father, will be the owner of an undivided fivefifteenths part. To have and to hold unto the said parties
of the second part, their heirs and assigns, to the only proper use, benefit and behoof of the said parties of the second
part, their heirs and assigns forever-"
William Anderson died intestate December 24, 1910,
leaving to survive him the said Rhoda and three children.
The question for the determination of the Court was whether
William Anderson and Rhoda A. Anderson, his wife, took an
estate by entireties with the right of survivorship as to the
described twelve-fifteenths interest or whether William Anderson took individually an undivided ten-fifteenths interest
and Rhoda A. Anderson took an undivided two-fifteenths interest in the said land. Judgment was directed to be entered
by the Court in favor of the plaintiff who was Mary Blease,
a daughter of William Anderson by a former wife.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the above described conveyance vested title in William Anderson and
Rhoda, his wife, as tenants in common. The Court, per Moschzisker, J., reviewed the cases of Bramberry's Est. 156 Pa.
628; Merritt vs. Whitlock, 211 Pa. 50; Alles vs. Lyon, 216
Pa. 604 and the remarks of Mitchell, 3., in those cases, and
also referred to Young's Est., 166 Pa. 645 and Hetzell vs.
Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60. Reference was also made to Bedford
Lodge vs. Lentz, 194 Pa- 399; Rhode's Est. 232 Pa. 489;
Meyer's Est. 232 Pa. 89; and Beihl vs. Martin, 236 Pa. 519.
Particularly, the Court said:
"While we have said more than once that the Married
Women's Property Acts do not abolish or affect estates by
entireties (Meyer's Est., 232 Pa. 89; Beihl vs. Martin, 236
Pa. 519) where the grant expressly or in effect creates such
an estate, yet at no time since the recent legislation conferring full competency upon married women to take and hold
real estate as their individual property, have we ruled that
a conveyance to husband and wife creating distinctly defined, undivided parts or individual estates to each, must be
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construed to creat an estate by entireties notwithstanding
the expressed intention of the grantor to the contrary; far
from so holding, all the decisions upon the subject point in
the other direction. In the case at bar we concur in the conclusion reached by the learned court below that the grantees
did not take by entireties but that each took an individual
undivided interest or estate in the property in question, as
particularly provided in the deed."
(TO BE CONCLUDED IN MARCH ISSUE).
A. J. W. H.
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MOOT COURT
BOROUGH OF X VS. WATER COMPANY
Corporations-Permissable Amendments Under Reserved Emendatory Power of the Legislature--Unjust Amendments225 Pa. 177 Criticised.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The company was incorporated with the exclusive right to furnish water within the borough. The charter provided that after
twenty-five years the borough might buy the property and franchises
of the company by paying the cost of erecting and maintaining
the plant plus 10 per cent per annum as interest thereon, less the
dividends that had been made and paid. A later act, enacted after
the lapse of twenty years, authorized the borough to have the property appraised and to buy at the appraisement and declared that if
the company refused to sell at that price, it should lose the exclusive
privilege of supplying the borough with water. This Is the
borough's pettion to the court to appoint appraisers under the
act. The company resists the application.
Chaplin, for Plaintiff.
Bohan, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Cherchesky, J. The charter granted to the corporation constituted a valid, binding contract between the State and the corporators. 94 Pa. 516.
Section o17 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania provides that "no law impairing the validity of contracts shall be nassed." However, the foregoing provision is modified in regard to
corporations by Section 10 of Article 16 which provides that the
"General Assembly shall have the power to alter, revoke or annul
any charter of incorporation now existing, and revocable at the
adoption of this constitution or any that may hereafter be created,
,whenever In their opinion, it may be Injurious to the citizens of this
Commonwealth, in such manner, however, that no injustice shall
be done to the corporation."
The question to be determined is whether the subsequent act
of the legislature transgresses the provision of Section 10 Article 16
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of the Constitution, that the legislative power to alter or annul shall
be exercised only in such manner that no injustice shall be done to
the corporators. The company was incorporated with the exclusive
right to furnish water to the borough for twenty-five years. At
the end of this period the borough was to take over the plant after
fulfilling certain conditions outlined in the charter. The later enactment of the legislature authorized the borough to appraise the
property of the corporation and to buy at the appraised value. It
also provided that if the company refused to sell at the appraised
value it would lose its exclusive right to furnish water to the borough. Although both the terms of the charter and the subsequent
act provide a means whereby the borough is to acquire the waterworks, the methods provided by the respective provisions in each
are very much different. Under the charter the value of the plant
is a fixed one, namely-the cost of erecting and maintaining the
plant plus 10 per cent per annum as interest, less the dividends
made and paid. The result, here, is one of computation; there is no
room for discretion or judgment. Under the subsequent act, It is
left to the appraisers to determine the value according to their
judgment irrespective of the Company's charter right to receive the
amount fixed therein. It is manifestly an injustice to the corporators for the -borough to take under the subsequent act. 229 Pa. 177,
220 Pa. 100. The stockholders of the Company when they invested
their money did so with the knowledge that they would have the
exclusive power to furnish water for twenty-five years; that they
would be protected from competition with a municipally managed
plant for twenty-five years; that if, at the end of twenty-five years,
the borough desired to purchase they would get their Investment
and interest thereon. As there is gross injustice done to the corporators by the subsequent act of legislature, the act is unconstitutional, transgressing the provisions of Section 10 of Article 16 of
the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
The petition of the borough Is therefore dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREX

COURT

Manheim Borough vs. Manheim. Water Co., 229 Pa. 177, supports
the decision of the learned court below.
We propose however, to consider features of that case which
may lead to doubt of its correctness.
The charter of the Water Co. was subject to the right of repeal
or alteration, but, in so repealing or altering "no injustice shall be
done to the corporation." But what shows that Injustice has been
done in the alteration of the charter? Only that the measure of
damages provided in the later act allows leus damage than that
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furnished in the earier. But does this prove that the later act commits an injustice? The earlier act may have given more than
justice. It furnished the cost of construction and maintenance.
But the later act was more than 20 years subsequent. Are we to
assume that the plant, after 20 years. is worth as much as it was
when it was new?
Again the earlier act provides for the payment of 10 per cent
interest. But, the legal rate of interest was only 6 per cent. Unless the water company has been charging exhorbitant rates, it
would be doubtful whether it made, or had a right to make, 10 per
cent. It Is not an injustice to deprive a person or corporation of
so much of its profit as is unjustly large. We cannot say then that
a provision for ascertaining the actual value of the plant at the
time of appropriation, is to do an Injustice, simply because that
method produces less than the charter method which gives an excessive compensation.
Again the method ordinarily pursued when land or other property is taken for public use, ,is to appraise its value by viewers
or by jury and to compel the owner to yield the property on the
payment of that amount. It sounds odd to say that this is an unjust method, applied as it is, in numberless cases. It Is hard to
see that the application of this method can be said to work unjust
results because It produces a standard of compensation less than
some other. Is our whole method of appraising property in the
condemnation of it,, to be branded as fraught with injustioe 9
We must then, In order to unhold the decision, lay down the
principle that If a method of compensation which is more than
just to the property owner and less than just to the public, is superseded by one which works fairness and justice to both, an injustice
has been done.
Again, it is to be remembered that some contracts it is Impossible bindingly to make. The right to take property my eminent domain cannot be taken from the public even by its own act. Nor
can this right be incumbered by agreements as to exaggerated compensation for the property taken.
Affirmed.

CARMODY VS. DAVIS
Landlord and Tenant-Responsibility for Repairs-Liability of Landlord for Injuries Caused by Alterations Made by Him271 Pa. 125 Distinguished
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Davis let a house to Carmody for a period of twelve years.
During the sixth year Davis, without suggestion from Carmody,
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elevated the house by two feet but did nothing to the structure itself. There was a porch in front of the house. In walking over it
Carmody broke through the floor and was seriously injured. He
could not have broken through had the floor not decayed nor could
he have sustained any injury if the floor had been as close to the
ground as before the elevation of the house. This is an action
against the landlord for the injury, a claim of $2,000 being made.
Johnson, for Plaintiff.
Rupp, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Kornrelch, J. This is a case in which the tenant sues his landlord for injuries resulting from voluntary repairs made by the landlord to the premises. The facts in this case at first glance would
seem identical with the facts in Gehr vs. Bessemer and Lake Erie
R. R. in 271 Pa. 25, cited by counsel, and were this so, we need
go no further in arriving at a decision. But on closer examination
we are of the opinion that a very appreciable difference exists between the two cases, which must lead us to a different conclusion
from that arrived at in the Pennsylvania case.
A landlord is under no duty to make repairs in absence of an
agreement to do so. But where he voluntarily undertakes to change
or repair the premises he is under a duty to do it in such a manner
as to leave the property in a reasonably safe condition.
In Gehr vs. Bessemer and Lake Erie R. R., the defendant leased
a dwelling house with a front porch to plaintiff. After plaintiff took
possession, the defendant voluntarily raised the building a height of
two feet. Six years later Mrs. Gehr, one of the plaintiffs was walking across the porch when the floor gave way and she was seriously
Injured. At the trial the evidence showed the actual cause of the
accident was the decayed condition of the floor. Upon these facts,
the court granted a non-suit against plaintiff on the ground that no
obligation existed on the part of the defendant to repair and no proof
of negligence was shown in raising the house.
But the court says further in that case: "We find no evidence
tending to show that the additional space of two feet left under the
porch contributed to make possible an acident. Its proximate cause
was the giving way of the porch floor and while the additional
space underneath may have served to increase the plaintiffs Injuries,
this Is an element for which defendant is not liable unless the original cause is chargeable to it."
In the case at bar however, the undisputed fact Is that the
additional space of two feet left under the porch did contribute to
make possible the accident. The facts expressly state that no
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injury could have been sustained If the floor had been as close to the
ground as before the elevation. If no injury could have been sustained before the porch was raised, even If plaintiff had broken
through boards which were decayed, It follows that the raising of the
porch must be taken as the proximate cause of the injury.
Another point which distinguishes this case from the Lake
Erie case Is the fact that in the latter, the injury took place sh
years after the repairs were made. The court may have been justified in finding that the raising of the house was too remote and
that in space of six years the boards in the porch had time to decay, for which the defendant was not responsible. In the facts of
the case at issue, no time is mentioned as Intervening between the act
of raising and the injury. We must assume, therefore, that the
accident took place shortly after the raising of the house was finished, and that at the time of the elevation, the porch timbers were
at least in the process of decay. From the meager statement of facts,
how can we assume otherwise? Can it be said that a porch of
sound timbers and of ordinary strength at the time of being elevated,
would, a short time afterward when the elevation is completed, fall
apart and allow a person walking on it to break through it?
While a landlord Is under no duty to repair a decayed porch in
absence of an agreement to do so, and hence is not liable for injuries that may result, yet if he voluntarily undertakes to repair or
change the premises by raising a house, and with it a porch that is
partly decayed, It must be that the duty then arises and evolves upon
him even to change or repair the decayed parts of the porch. Otherwise how can it be said that he left the premises in a reasonably
safe condition as they were before, when before no Injury could have
been sustained?
We think it not unreasonable that a landlord, In changing the
premises voluntarily and thereby creating possiblities for Injury
not in existence before, shall be held liable for Injuries as a result of
his neglect In repairing defective parts of the premises, the changing
of which gave rise to the injury. Judgment Is, therefore, In favor
of plaintiff for the sum of $2,000.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Nothing In this case indicates that the landlord was responsible
for the frangibleness of the floor of the porch. He was not bound
to Improve it, or, in case of deterioration, to restore It to its former
better condition.
On the other hand, the landlord may not, without the tenant's
consent make such alterations In the premises as lessen its utility
to the tenant. This may result from increasing the risk of serious
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consequences from the use of the premises. No change in the quality
of the floor of the porch was made in this, case. But, it lay directly
on the ground and a break in it could not be followed by Injuries
more than negligible. After the floor was elevated two feet, the
consequences of a fracture of it became more grave.
We think in increase in risk by the lanloard has made him
responsible for the consequences that have issued from it. He
should have considered the probable effect of the condition of the
timber; and also of its giving way, after its being lifted two feet
above the former position.
The injury to the plaintiff was the result (a) of the weak and
decayed state of the wood; and (b) the space between it and the
ground. There would have been no liability for the results simply
of the former; but the injury suffered by the plaintiff was not
caused by it alone, but by the latter. We think that the landlord
should have considered the effect of the change of position of the
floor, in view of the actual state of the timber in it and, realizing
that a break in the former would likely lead to grave consequnences,
after the alteration of its position, should have refrained from making it until he had the consent of the tenant, or, at least, until
she was made to understand how fragile the floor was, and how
serious the effect of the break of it, after its elevation, might be.
We find nothing in Gehr vs. R. R. Co., 271 Pa. 125, inconsistent with the view of this case that we have taken.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

HOFFER VS. CLYTIEER
Easement of Right of Way-Rights Remaining in Owner of Servient Land-Right to Enclose the Way Against Stray
Cattle etc-Reasonableness of the Enclosure--73
Pa. 80; 78 Sup. 115 Approved -167 Pa.
18 Quoted
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Clymer owned a farm which faced a highway, and Hoffer, the
farm contiguous to Clymer's but remote from the road. Both tracts
had belonged to X, who conveyed to Hoffer the remote tract, with
the right of way across the tract next to the road, for wagons, carriages, horses and cattle. Clymer, in order to prevent his cattle
from straying, and to exclude other cattle, placed three bars at the
entrance to the right of way, from Hoffer's farm. This is a bill in
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equity to require the taking down of the bars in question and to
prevent their being replaced. The injunction was granted.
Moon, for Plaintiff.
Lilenfield, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Monheit, J. The question we are confronted with Is whether
said bars were an unreasonable obstruction.
In 167 Pa. 18, 3 Sup 176, where land is subject to an easement the owner may erect a gate provided he reserves a reasonable
regard for the convenience of the owner of the easement.
There is nothing in the facts that would indicate that the defendant had any intention of depriving the plaintiff of his easement
or causing him a hardship by setting up the bars. The facts merely
state that the purpose of the bars was to prevent his cattle or cattle
of others from strmying upon his land or other lands and thereby
causing damage to the property. It would be grossly unreasonable
to restrict the plaintiff from constructing said bars when such consequences may be easily avoided.
We believe the bars were of a movable type as there is no
evidence to show that they were set there permanently. As long as
the construction did not unreasonably interfere with the use of the
wvay, it should be allowed to remain.
The land was the property of the defendant and he had a right
to use it for any purpose that did not interfere with the easement.
To do this it was necessary under the circumstances, as stated in the
facts, to set up bar and as long as this is done with a reasonable
regard to the convenience of the owner of the easement, it affords
him no just ground for complaint. As there Is nothing set forth
in the facts showing that the defendant Is depriving the plaintiff
or hindering him in the use of the easement we may reasonably assume that the bars were easily removable and worked no hardship
upon the plaintiff. It is a settled rule of law and as laid down in
9 R. C. L. 800, that a grant of way without reservation of the right
to maintain gates does not necessarily preclude the owner of the
land from doing so, and unless it Is expressly stipulated that the
way shall be an open one, or it appears from the terms of the grant
or the circumstances that such was the intention. We have nothing
In the case at bar showing such an expression or intention.
We feel that where bars are movable Dnes, and In 78 Sup. 15;
73 Pa. 80, it is held that removable bars are not a hindrance or
obstruction to plaintiff's right of way.
The lower court erred in granting an injunction.
Judgment reversed.
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OPINION OF SUPREE

COURT

Clymer owned the land, charged with a right of way in favor of
Hoffer, for wagons, carriages, horses, and cattle. Clymer desiring
to prevent the straying of his own cattle and to exclude the cattle
that might stray from Hoffer's land, placed three bars at the entrance of the way from Heifer's land.
The agreement between them might have stipulated that the
entrance to Clymer's land should not be impeded by fence, bar, or
otherwise. Such a provision would have been irksome to Clymer.
His fields would have liable to be overrun by horses or cattle, to
prevent which he would have been obliged to construct a lane, with
fence on each side, the length of the distance from Hoffer's line and
the highway. The assumption of such a duty would be very improbable in the absence of clear evidence of it.
We may discover a duty in Clymer not seriously to inconvenience Hoffer in the use of the way, but we cannot discover that
placing three movable bars across the entrance is planting an obstacle of which Hoifer can legitimately complain. What is said in
Hartman vs. Fick, 167 Pa. 18 is appropriate here. "The easem%,,~t
was only for passage. The land remained the property of the plaintiff and he had a right to use it for any purpose that did not interfere
with the easement. To do this it might be necessary under some circumstances to enclose the way In the field over which it passes,
and if this Is done with a reasonable regard to the convenience of
the owner of the easement, it affords him no just ground of complaint." Cf. Connery vs. Brooks, 78 Pa 80; Zeigler vs. Hoffman,
78 Superior 115.
The judgment is affirmed.

CO1MMIONWEALTH VS. HOBSON
Impeachment of Witnesses--Specific Acts Provable Only by Record
of Conviction or Admission of Witness-Acts Must be of
Recent Origin-Law of Penna. Conflicting on
This Subject-271 Pa. 271 Approved
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Theft. X, a witness for the prosecution, testified to the theft.
He was cross-examined whether he had not for years maintained
illicit relations with a certain woman prior to 1905 and whether he
was not engaged in pilfering articles from stores. The trial was in'
1923. He answered "no" to both questions. The court declined to
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allow witnesses to be called to contradict him.
Peal.
Golden, for Plaintiff.
Barris, for Defendant.

Verdict, guilty.

Ap-

OPINION OF THE COURT
Crow, T. The whole question in the case at bar seems to be,
whether this method of Impeaching the credibility of a witness may
be used. We are unddr the opinion that this method cannot be used.
This question is very well answered In an article written by William Trickett and found in the Dickinson Law Review. This says
that, "the most proper test of character, before human tribunals,
Is reputation and not single acts. And it is the only practicable one;
for the witness or the party calling him can be prepared for no other,
and the court can administer no other; for it cannot possibly try
collateral issues, or the events of every witness' life in order to
decide the contraverted cause." Here we find it very plainly stated
that it would be impossible to divulge every act committed by a
witness and if this were allowed it would take a great deal of time
to decide each issue. It would hinder the exercise of Justice by the
tribunals.
The case of Marshall vs. Carr, 271 Pa. 271, is directly on point
with the case at bar. This case holds that, "a witness cannot be
cross-examined as to his former misconduct with a woman, where
such mis-conduct has nothing to do with the case on trial, and
the purpose of the question is merely to discredit his testimony; and
especially is this the case where the alleged mis-conduct occurred
twenty-six years before the trial." In the case at bar the niconduct alleged occurred 18 years before the trial and we think that
this misconduct is far too remote to be admissable. If it had
happened two years or five years before perhaps it would not be
too remote but we will not attempt to draw a line as to when it,
would be admissible and when it would not be admissible. This is
largely in the discretion of the Judge of the court.
In Gleenleaf on Evidence, p. 461-9; we find that, "It would be absolutely intolerable, if, by being brought into court as a witness, he
should be bound to submit all the acts of his life to the exposure of ma
lice, under the pretence of testing his credibility. If such were the test,
courts would often present, In language and temper, scenes of unmitigated ruffianism, and the means of enforcing law and order, in
society, would be denounced as sources of corruption and disorder."
In 85 Pa. 139, it was held that if n question is put to a witness
which Is collateral or irrelevant to the issue, his answer cannot be
contradicted by the party who put the question, but it Is conclusive
against him. In 241 Pa. 458, we find the general rule to be that when
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a witness has been cross-examined upon matters not relevant to
the issue, he cannot be discredited by proof that he testified falsely
as to the irrelevant matters.
In view of the authorities stated above we hold that the witness
cannot be cross-examined as to incidents which happened 18 years
prior to the trial in order to affect his credibility as a witness.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A witness may be impeached in sundry ways. He may do discreditable acts, which veracious people do not usually do. The knowledge, by the jury, that he does such acts, would lessen, and properly
so, the respect for his declarations as a witness.
How may the doinR of these acts be proved? Not otherwise
than by a record of conviction of having done them, or by the witness' answer on cross-examination confessing the conviction, or the
wrongful acts, even if no conviction has occurred.
The answers, self-exculpatory, of the witness are not rebutable
by other testimony.
The first impeaching fact is the maintenance of illicit relations
with a certain woman, prior to 1905. The trial took place in 1923,
18 years thereafter. We think the intervay too great to warrant
the assumption that the improper relation continued down to the
trial. It may have been abandoned years ago. A man should not be
impeached for an offence against morality or law, for so long a time
after the commission of it.
It was also asked whether he was not engaged in pilfering articles from stores. This act would, we think, be Incompatible with
normal credibility, and It would be proper to show it.
But, how? The witness has denied that he did the act which the
question suggested. The court declined to allow the answer to be
contradicted by other witnesses. This, we think, was correct. The
multiplication of issues must be avoided. If witnesses could be called to prove the guilt other witnesses could be called, probably, to contradict them.
The witness X supported the prosecution. There is no reason
for distinguishing between an accusing and an excusing witness.
Both can be impeached by showing facts by means of their own admission of facts derogatory to their character. But other proof woul'
not be admissable.
Cf. Common. vs. Varano, 258 Pa. 442, where one of the permitted
questions was, whether the witness was not a member of the Black
Hand Society, or of a society which was pledged to disregard the
American oath.
We do not attempt to reconcile the decisions; e. g. Common. vs.
Williams, 209 Pa. 529; Marshall vs. Carr, 271 Pa. 271 etc. A wielder
of a scythe should some along and extirpate some of the conflicting
decisions.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITLTED ANNOTATED. American Law Book Company, Brooklyn, New York,
1924. Pages 280.
The publishers of this book are the publishers of the
CORPUS JURIS-CYC SYSTEM and the references in the annotations are all to the various volumes of that systn= The
book contains the Declaration of Independenc. the Articles
of Confederation, the Ordinance. of. 1787 and the Constitzition, of the United States, first printed, in smalt type without
the annotations and then in large type with the annotations
The subject CONSTITUTIONAL LAW occupies 640
pages of volume 12 of Corpus Juris and is preceded by the
usual careful analysis and sub-analysis with over a page of
cross references. These, supplumented by the Index and
Concordance volume, also called the Deck-Book, have, enabled
the student of Constitutional Law to find the cases on a particular point with reasonable facility in the past. However,
the method adopted in this new book of making direct references to every article of the entire- system which contains
any discussion of a. constitutional question by an, annotation
following each word, phrase or clause of the constitution is
bound to prove a great time saver and insure -the fullest utility of this excellent work. Naturally one expects to find a
large proportion of the references to the article on Constitutional Law but the surprise lies in the innumerable references
to the other articles of the system. The publishers have
doubtless felt that the fundamental importance of the subject justifies the effort to give the maximum service possible
to the profession to enable the bench and bar to brief exhaustively every question arising under the Constitution of
the United States. Few subjects lend themselves to this
treatment but the popularity of annotated editions of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act and other laws adopted
in many states prove that this is the most convenient method
of finding the law.

Owen's Law Quizzer, West Publishing Company, St.
Paul, Minn., 1924.
This is the fifth edition of a book which first appeared
in 1898. Its various editions have won the appreciation of a
large number of students of law, in every one of the twentyfive years since its publication. It contains brief treatises
on Admiralty, Agency, Bailments and Carriers, Bankruptcy,
Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law, and twentyfour other topics. Students preparing for the bar examina-

tions, find brief reviews of the various branches useful, and
even the practitioner may profit by an occasional excursion
over the multifarious subdivisions of the law. The contents
of the book are taken from approved text-writers, and as a
quick mnemonic, they may be read with advantage. The
book containing over 800 pages, is of convenient bulk.
Cases on the Law of Sales of Goods, selected from Decisions of English and American Courts, by Frederic Campbell Woodward, Professor of Law in. the University of Chicago. Second Edition. The West Publishing Company, St.
Paul Minn., 1925.
That the cases on Sales have been judiciously selected
by the learned compiler of this volume may be taken for
granted, in view of his long experience as a teacher of law,
and the thorough investigations he is known to have made
in the law of contracts, and allied subjects. An examination
of this volume corroborates the anticipation with which it
was begun. We can not do better than to state the analysis
of the subject of sales in conformity, with which the cases
have been selected. After exhibiting the subject matter of
the contract of sales, the 2nd chapter deals with cases on the
unconditional contract to sell specific goods; also, goods to
which something is yet to be done;, sales or return or on approval, cash sales, contracts to sell unascertained goods of a
fungible nature; appropriations by delivery to carrier and otherwise. Then follow cases treating the effect of taking a document of title, and of negotiation or transfer thereof; the retention of the right of possession or property; effect of negotiation or transfer of documents of title; effect of sale by
bailor or factor; reservation of property by seller after delivery to buyer; retention of possession of seller after transfer of property; effect of fraud on the seller; and of sales in
bulk.
Six other chapters follow, dealing with destruction of
the goods; the obligations of seller and buyer; the rights of
unpaid seller against the goods; remedies of the seller on the
contract, remedies of the buyer on the contract; the statute
of frauds.
The appendices contain the English sales of goods act;
the Uniform Sales Act; a list of the states in which the act
has been adopted; the Uniform Conditional Sales Act; etc.,
etc.
A study of the cases here brought together, will bestow a
comprehensive and profound knowledge of the law of salesFor class use, the book can be cordially recommended.
W.T.

